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Abstract. We consider a Stackelberg pricing problem in directed net-
works. Tariﬀs have to be deﬁned by an operator, the leader, for a subset
of the arcs, the tariﬀ arcs. Clients, the followers, choose paths to route
their demand through the network selﬁshly and independently of each
other, on the basis of minimal cost. Assuming there exist bounds on the
costs clients are willing to bear, the problem is to ﬁnd tariﬀs such as to
maximize the operator’s revenue. Except for the case of a single client, no
approximation algorithm is known to date for that problem. We derive
the ﬁrst approximation algorithms for the case of multiple clients. Our
results hold for a restricted version of the problem where each client takes
at most one tariﬀ arc to route the demand. We prove that this problem
is still strongly NP-hard. Moreover, we show that uniform pricing yields
both an m–approximation, and a (1 + lnD)–approximation. Here, m is
the number of tariﬀ arcs, and D is upper bounded by the total demand.
We furthermore derive lower and upper bounds for the approximability
of the pricing problem where the operator must serve all clients, and
we discuss some polynomial special cases. A computational study with
instances from France Te´le´com suggests that uniform pricing performs
better than theory would suggest.
1 Introduction
The general setup for the tariﬁcation problem that we study involves two non-
cooperative groups, an operator that sets tariﬀs, the leader of the Stackelberg
game, and n clients that have to pay these tariﬀs, the followers of the Stackelberg
game. More precisely, we assume that a network is given, and a subset of m arcs,
the tariﬀ arcs, are owned by an operator. The operator can set the tariﬀs on these
arcs for renting capacity to one or several clients. Each client wishes to route
a certain amount of a commodity on a path connecting two vertices. Such a
path can involve one or several arcs belonging to the operator, and we assume
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that each client selﬁshly selects a path with minimum cost to route his demand.
Before the clients select their paths, the operator has to set the tariﬀs, which
he does in order to maximize total revenue. In order to avoid non-boundedness,
we assume that clients always have the alternative of routing on a path without
using any of the operators arcs.
The problem we consider here is diﬀerent in two aspects from the network
congestion problems studied recently, e.g., by Roughgarden and Tardos [11], and
Cole et al. [2, 3]. First, we assume that there is no congestion, hence the clients
do not inﬂuence each other. They choose minimum cost paths to route their
commodities, independent of each other. The Game Theoretic setting is only
introduced by the fact that there exist an operator trying to maximize revenue
using high tariﬀs, and the clients try to avoid high tariﬀs by choosing minimal
cost paths. Second, the pricing takes place before the users choose their paths, so
we are faced with a Stackelberg game, where the operator (leader) ﬁrst sets the
tariﬀs, and then, subject to these tariﬀs, the clients (followers) react selﬁshly.
A natural formulation of the problem, referred to as the (general) tariﬁca-
tion problem, is the bilevel linear formulation of Labbe´ et al. [9]. They show
that already the problem with a single client is (strongly) NP-hard, given that
also negative tariﬀs are allowed. Roch et al. [10] show that the single client
problem remains (strongly) NP-hard, even when restricted to nonnegative tar-
iﬀs. In the same paper, a polynomial time O(lnm)–approximation algorithm for
the problem with a single client is proposed, where m is the number of tar-
iﬀ arcs.
Our Results. We derive the ﬁrst approximation results for the problem with
multiple clients. However, we consider a restricted variant of the problem, since
we assume that the path taken by any client utilizes at most one tariﬀ arc.
Several applications of this particular tariﬁcation problem, to which we refer as
the river tariﬁcation problem (RTP) are brieﬂy discussed in Section 2. Section 3
describes the model in detail. In Section 4, we show that the river tariﬁcation
problem is (strongly) NP-hard.
The quality of uniform tariﬁcation policies, where all arcs are priced with the
same tariﬀ, is analyzed in Section 5. The problem to ﬁnd an optimal uniform
tariﬀ is well-known to be solvable in polynomial time, even for the general tariﬁ-
cation problem [12]. We show that uniform tariﬁcation is an m–approximation,
and this is tight. Using a simple geometric argument, we also show that uniform
tariﬁcation is a (1+lnD)–approximation, which is tight up to a constant factor.
Here, D is the total demand that is served by the operator in an optimal solu-
tion, which is upper bounded by the total demand. Hence, whenever the clients
have unit demand, this yields a (1 + lnn)–approximation.
We also consider another variant of the problem where the operator is forced
to serve all clients. We show in Section 6, by a reduction from Independent Set,
that this problem is not approximable to within a factor O(m1−ε) or O(n1/2−ε),
unless ZPP = NP. (Recall that m is the number of tariﬀ arcs and n is the
number of clients.) On the positive side, we can show that the problem admits
an n-approximation.
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We brieﬂy discuss some polynomially solvable special cases of the river tar-
iﬁcation problem in Section 7. Finally, we empirically analyze the quality of
uniform tariﬁcation policies in Section 8, using instances from France Te´le´com.
2 Applications
As an illustration, consider transportation networks that resemble the situation
of a town that is divided by a river. Diﬀerent traversal possibilities exist, and
some of these are to be priced by an operator. These traversal possibilities are
the tariﬀ arcs in the network. Customers want to route certain commodities from
one side of the river to the other.
Such a network topology may be assumed (after a simple transformation
described below) in telecommunication networks where we know a priori that
the path of each client takes at most one tariﬀ arc. This occurs, e.g., in the
international interconnections market, where several operators oﬀer connections
to a particular country. If we focus on the market for this particular country, we
can assume that it is not proﬁtable for any client to enter the country twice.
For another motivation, consider the internet. Whenever an autonomous sys-
tem (represented by some subnetwork) has to transit data, the data may enter
and exit the autonomous system at diﬀerent points. Clients have to pay a price
for transmitting data through the autonomous system, yielding revenue for its
owner. The data ﬂow can be modelled such that once it is routed through the
autonomous system, it does not pass a second time, thereby creating an instance
of the river tariﬁcation problem.
Finally, in point-to-point markets, a telecommunications operator is oﬀering
bandwidth capacity between two points in diﬀerent qualities of service (QoS). In
that setting, it is often the case that information is available concerning the prices
customers are willing to pay for diﬀerent levels of QoS. That pricing problem
can be modelled easily as a river tariﬁcation problem, too.
3 Model
An instance of the general tariﬁcation problem is a directed graph G = (N,A),
where the arc set A is partitioned into a set of m tariﬀ arcs T ⊆ A and a set of
ﬁxed cost arcs F = A \ T . There are n clients (or commodities) k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where each client k has a demand dk that has to be routed from source node
sk to target node tk. Because there is no congestion involved, we may assume
without loss of generality that all demand values dk are scaled to be integral.
We deﬁne for a commodity k the set of all possible paths from sk to tk by Pk.
The tariﬀ on a tariﬀ arc a ∈ T is denoted by τa, and the vector of all tariﬀs is
given by τ = (τa)a∈T . The cost of a ﬁxed cost arc a ∈ F is denoted by ca.
The clients route their demands from source to destination according to a
path with minimal total cost, where the total cost of a path is deﬁned as the
sum of the tariﬀs and ﬁxed costs on the arcs of the path. Whenever the client
Pricing Network Edges to Cross a River 143
has a choice among multiple paths with the same total cost but with diﬀerent
revenues for the operator, we assume that the client takes the path that is most
proﬁtable to the operator. This can always be achieved with arbitrary precision
by reducing all tariﬀs by some small value ε. We assume that an {sk, tk}-path
exists that consists only of ﬁxed cost arcs for every client k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, since
the problem is otherwise unbounded.
Without going into further details, we mention that this tariﬁcation problem
is a classical Stackelberg Game that can be modelled as (linear-linear) bilevel
program [9, 1]. It follows from Jeroslow [7] that (linear-linear) bilevel programs
are NP-hard in general. For annotated bibliographies on bilevel programming,
see Vicente and Calamai [13] or Dempe [4].
We next describe a simple transformation of the given graph G that allows
us to restrict to very speciﬁc graphs (although probably losing certain graph
properties, such as planarity). When replacing shortest paths using only ﬁxed
cost arcs by direct arcs, and possibly introducing some dummy arcs with zero
or inﬁnite cost, one obtains a shortest path graph model (SPGM) as deﬁned by
Bouhtou et al. [1]. In that model, all tariﬀ arcs are disjoint, and there exists an
arc from any source node sk to the tail node of any tariﬀ arc, and from the head
node of any tariﬀ arc to any target node tk. Moreover, there exists a ﬁxed cost
arc (sk, tk) for all k = 1, . . . , n, and the cost ck is the highest acceptable price
for client k.
The additional assumption in the problem considered in this paper (to which
we refer as the river tariﬁcation problem) is the following: Independent of the
tariﬀs, any client routes his demand only on a path that includes at most one
tariﬀ arc. In the shortest graph path model, that is equivalent to the deletion of
any backward-arc that might exist between the head nodes of tariﬀ arcs back to
tail nodes of other tariﬀ arcs. Figure 1 shows the shortest path graph model of an
instance of the river tariﬁcation problem with three tariﬀ arcs and two clients.
The tariﬀ arcs ai, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} are given by the dashed arcs in the network.
We may also assume without loss of generality that all ﬁxed cost arcs incident
with the target nodes tk have zero cost (by adding their costs to the ﬁxed cost
a1
a2
a3
1
22
1
s
ts
t
Fig. 1. River tariﬁcation problem with n = 2 and m = 3
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arcs incident with sk). Notice that the only diﬀerence to the general tariﬁcation
problem described above is the non-existence of backward arcs.
The essential parameters that deﬁne an instance of a (river) tariﬁcation prob-
lem are therefore the number of tariﬀ arcsm, the number of clients n, the demand
values dk, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the costs ca of the ﬁxed cost arcs a ∈ F . Due to
the fact that any path taken by a client involves exactly one ﬁxed cost arc with
non-zero cost, we may assume without loss of generality that the costs ca of the
ﬁxed cost arcs a ∈ F are integral. Moreover, due to the integrality of the costs of
the ﬁxed cost arcs, it is immediate that any reasonable solution will adopt only
tariﬀs which are integral, too. Notice that this might not hold for the general
tariﬁcation problem, where a path chosen by a client can consist of more than
one tariﬀ arc.
4 Complexity
Roch et al. [10] show that the general tariﬁcation problem is NP-hard in the
strong sense, even when restricted to a single client, using a reduction from the
NP-complete problem 3-Sat [5]. Their reduction works for tariﬁcation problems
where paths are allowed to use (and indeed, must use) several tariﬀ arcs. We
show that the tariﬁcation problem with multiple clients, but restricted to at
most one tariﬀ arc per path, is NP-hard in the strong sense, too.
We also use a reduction from 3-Sat. Therefore, consider a boolean function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} on n variables x1, . . . , xn, in conjunctive normal form. Such
a function f is the conjunction of m clauses Ck,
f =
m∧
k=1
Ck , (1)
each clause Ck being the disjunction of three literals, Ck = (k1∨ k2∨ k3). Any
literal kj represents either a variable xi, or its negation x¯i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then
f is satisﬁable if there exists a truth assignment x1,. . . , xn such that at least
one literal per clause is true.
Any function of the form (1) can be polynomially transformed to an instance
of the river tariﬁcation problem as follows. For each variable xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
we construct a constant-size subnetwork as shown in Figure 2. Each of these
subnetworks has three clients with unit demand, with origin-destination pairs
{sij , tij}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Moreover, each subnetwork has two tariﬀ arcs, ai repre-
senting the truth assignment xi = 1, and a¯i representing xi = 0, as depicted in
Figure 2.
An upper bound on the cost of routing commodities 1 and 3 is given by ﬁxed
cost arcs (si1, ti1) and (si3, ti3), both with cost 3. For commodity 2, the upper
bound on the cost is given by a ﬁxed cost arc (si2, ti2), with cost 2. The maximal
revenue for each subnetwork is thus given by setting one of the tariﬀs to 2, and
the other to 3, yielding a revenue of 2 · 2 + 3 = 7. In all other cases, the revenue
is not more than 6.
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Fig. 2. Subnetwork for variable xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Next, for each clause Ck, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we create a clause-commodity k
with origin destination pairs {sk, tk}, with unit demand. Whenever a variable xi
(x¯i, respectively) appears as one of clause Ck’s literals, we connect sk to si1 (si3,
respectively), and ti1 (ti3, respectively) to tk, using arcs of zero cost. In addition,
we introduce a ﬁxed cost arc (sk, tk) with cost 2, deﬁning an upper bound of 2
for the cost of routing clause-commodity k. The so-deﬁned instance of the river
tariﬁcation problem has 2n tariﬀ arcs, 3n + m commodities (or clients), and
7m+ 11n ﬁxed cost arcs, hence the transformation is indeed polynomial.
Theorem 1. The river tariﬁcation problem is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Consider the polynomial transformation deﬁned previously. It is now
straightforward to show that a satisfying truth assignment for f exists if and
only if the revenue for the river tariﬁcation problem is equal to 2m+ 7n. 	unionsq
The reduction used for the proof of Theorem 1 shows that the river tariﬁcation
problem remains NP-hard even for unit demands, a ﬁxed number of tariﬀ values
and when the operator is forced to use tariﬀs such that he serves (a given subset
of) all clients.
5 The Quality of Uniform Tariﬁcation Policies
The uniform tariﬁcation problem (UTP) is the same as the general tariﬁcation
problem, with the additional restriction that all tariﬀs are required to be iden-
tical. As shown by van Hoesel et al. [12], the uniform tariﬁcation problem can
be solved in polynomial time, even in the general setting where clients may use
paths with several tariﬀ arcs. The algorithm described in van Hoesel et al. [12]
uses the parametric shortest path algorithm of Young et al. [14] and Karp and
Orlin [8] to determine the tariﬀ values (i.e. breakpoints) for which the shortest
path tree changes for any client. Calculating the revenue for the operator at
each breakpoint and maintaining the best solution yields the optimal uniform
tariﬁcation policy in polynomial time.
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We next analyze the loss that can be experienced by adopting such a uniform
tariﬁcation policy for the river tariﬁcation problem. Apart from theoretical in-
terest, the question is motivated by the interest in eﬃcient tariﬁcation strategies
in a more general setting with more than one operator. In addition, although
it is quite easy to think of smarter tariﬁcation policies, so far all these policies,
except uniform tariﬁcation, resisted our attempts of a worst-case analysis.
Therefore, denote by ΠUTP the revenue for an optimal uniform tariﬁcation,
and by ΠOPT the revenue for an optimal non-uniform tariﬁcation. By deﬁnition,
ΠUTP ≤ ΠOPT.
Lemma 1. If an optimal tariﬁcation for the river tariﬁcation problem with rev-
enue ΠOPT utilizes at most r diﬀerent tariﬀs, then for the optimal uniform
tariﬁcation, ΠUTP ≥ ΠOPT/r.
The proof of this lemma is indeed trivial. To this end, consider an optimal
non-uniform tariﬁcation with tariﬀs τ1 ≤ · · · ≤ τm, and let Di be the total
demand on an arc ai with tariﬀ τ i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. By D =
∑n
k=1Dk we denote
the total demand served by the operator. Then the revenue created by this
solution is the area under the following ‘staircase’ function f : [0, D]→ [0,∞[.
f(x) = τ i for all x with
∑
j<i
Dj ≤ x <
∑
j≤i
Dj , i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (2)
Proof (of Lemma 1). Consider any of the rectangles inscribed under the graph
of function f(x), with area Ti := τ i ·
∑
j≥iDj . Then it holds that Π
UTP ≥ Ti
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, since the area of any such rectangle is a lower bound for
the revenue yielded by the optimal uniform tariﬀ ΠUTP. (Notice that this does
not hold for the general tariﬁcation problem.) Hence, if only r diﬀerent tariﬀs
are utilized, we consider the r (inclusion-)maximal rectangles under function f ,
say Ti1 , . . . , Tir , and get r ·ΠUTP ≥
∑r
j=1 Tij ≥ ΠOPT. 	unionsq
Since r ≤ m, Lemma 1 yields the following theorem. Tightness of the result
will be shown below, using Example 1.
Theorem 2. Uniform tariﬁcation is an m–approximation for the river tariﬁca-
tion problem.
We next derive an another bound on the quality of uniform tariﬁcation poli-
cies, using a geometric argument.
Theorem 3. Uniform tariﬁcation is a (1 + lnD)–approximation for the river
tariﬁcation problem, where D ≤ ∑nk=1 dk is the total demand that is served by
the operator in an optimal solution.
Proof. Indeed, we will even prove a slightly stronger result than claimed in The-
orem 3. Consider an optimal non-uniform tariﬁcation, and recall the deﬁnition of
the corresponding staircase function f in (2), as well as the inscribed rectangles,
with areas Ti = τ i ·
∑
j≥iDj . Let  be the index of the maximal area rectangle
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among all Ti, with area T. Let x :=
∑
j≥Dj = T/τ . Moreover, denote by
τmax the maximal tariﬀ utilized in that optimal solution. We show
ΠUTP ≥ Π
OPT
1 + ln(Dτmax/T)
. (3)
Theorem 3 then follows, because T ≥ τmax by deﬁnition of T. To prove (3), we
deﬁne the function
g(x) :=
T
D − x for x ∈ [0, D) . (4)
We claim that g(x) ≥ f(x) for x ∈ [0, D). To see this, take any x with∑j<iDj ≤
x <
∑
j≤iDj , then f(x) = τ i by deﬁnition. Now
g(x) =
T
D − x ≥
T
D −∑j<iDj =
T∑
j≥iDj
=
T
Ti/τ i
≥ τ i = f(x) ,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows by choice of x, and the last follows by choice
of  as the index of the largest rectangle.
Hence, the area under the staircase function, which equals ΠOPT, can be
upper bounded in terms of the area deﬁned by the function g(x), as depicted
in Figure 3. To compute this area, we partition it into three parts, namely the
rectangle T itself, the area under g(x) on the domain x ∈ [0, D − x], as well
as the area to the right of g(x) on the domain τ ∈ [τ , τmax]. The latter is the
integral of the function D − g−1(τ) = T/τ on the domain [τ , τmax]. We thus
obtain the following.
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Fig. 3. Illustration for the proof of Theorem 3
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ΠOPT ≤ T +
∫ D−x
0
T
D − x dx+
∫ τmax
τ 
T
τ
dτ
= T[1 + lnD + ln τmax − ln τ  − lnx]
= T [1 + ln(Dτmax/T)] ,
and since T ≤ ΠUTP, claim (3) follows. 	unionsq
Notice that claim (3) conﬁrms the following geometric intuition: The closer
the staircase function f(x) is to the straight line x → (τmax/D) · x, the closer
is T to Dτmax/4, which yields an approximation ratio of (1 + ln 4) ≈ 2.4 for
uniform tariﬁcation. Geometric intuition indeed suggests a ratio of roughly 2,
the additional 0.4 being caused be the diﬀerence between the functions g(x)
and f(x). In Section 8, we compare the quality of uniform versus non-uniform
tariﬁcation, based on instances obtained from France Te´le´com.
In the case of unit demands of the clients, that is, if dk = 1 for all clients
k = 1, . . . , n, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1. Whenever clients have unit demands, uniform tariﬁcation is a
(1 + lnn)–approximation for the river tariﬁcation problem.
Finally, let us show tightness of the bounds in Theorems 2 and 3.
Example 1. Given n=m commodities and m tariﬀ arcs. Every commodity is
operating its own subnetwork with one tariﬀ arc, thus the entire network consists
of m disjoint subnetworks and each of them contains one commodity and one
tariﬀ arc. Fix b > 1 and let the demand in subnetwork k be given by dk =
bk−bk−1, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. This way, the total demand D equals bm−1. Moreover,
the maximal revenue for subnetwork k is limited by a ﬁxed cost arc (sk, tk), with
cost ck = b2m−k. Hence, the maximal tariﬀ τmax equals b2m−1. 	unionsq
In the optimal solution, the tariﬀ for each subnetwork k is set to its maximal
value, b2m−k. Each subnetwork therefore contributes a revenue of b2m − b2m−1,
andΠOPT = m(b2m−b2m−1). The optimal uniform tariﬁcation consists in setting
the tariﬀ on all tariﬀ arcs to bm. This way, every unit of demand creates a proﬁt of
bm, yielding a total revenue of b2m−bm. Other (reasonable) uniform tariﬀs would
be values b2m−k, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. This yields a total revenue of b2m− b2m−k,
which is less. Therefore, we obtain
ΠUTP/ΠOPT =
b2m − bm
m(b2m − b2m−1) ≤
b2m
m(b2m − b2m−1) =
1
m
· b
b− 1 .
Now, observe that in the optimal solutionm diﬀerent tariﬀs are utilized. Lemma 1
(Theorem 2, respectively) suggests that uniform tariﬁcation provides an m–
approximation. Example 1 proves that this is best possible, since b can be chosen
arbitrarily large.
Moreover, Theorem 3 suggests that uniform tariﬁcation is a (1 + lnD)–
approximation. In Example 1, we have D = (bm − 1) and thus (1 + lnD) =
1+ ln(bm− 1) ≤ 1+m ln b. Hence, Theorem 3 yields that uniform tariﬁcation is
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a O(m)–approximation on this example. The same Example 1 shows that O(m)
is indeed best possible. Summarized, we thus get the following.
Theorem 4. For uniform tariﬁcation, the performance bound of Theorem 2 is
best possible, and the performance bound of Theorem 3 is best possible up to a
constant factor.
6 All-Service River Tariﬁcation Problem
In this section, we consider the following variation of the river tariﬁcation prob-
lem. The operator must set tariﬀs in order to capture the demand of all clients,
that is, tariﬀs must be such that no client k is forced to use the arc (sk, tk). We
refer to this problem as the all-service river tariﬁcation problem. NP-hardness
of this problem follows by our previous reduction presented in Section 4.
It follows from trivial examples that the maximal revenue for the all-service
problem can be an arbitrary factor away from the maximal revenue without the
all-service constraint. Hence, we have an arbitrarily high ‘cost of regulation’.
In addition, we can show that the maximal revenue for the all-service problem
cannot be approximated well.
Theorem 5. For any ε > 0, the existence of a polynomial time approximation
algorithm for the all-service river tariﬁcation problem with with n clients and m
tariﬀ arcs with worst case ratio O(m1−ε) or O(n1/2−ε) implies ZPP = NP.
Proof. The proof uses an approximation preserving reduction from Indepen-
dent Set [5] to the all-service RTP. So assume we are given a graph G = (V,E),
and the problem is to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality subset V ′ ⊆ V of vertices such
that no two vertices in V ′ are connected by an edge. The transformation works
as follows. For every vertex v ∈ V we introduce a client with origin-destination
pair {sv, tv} and demand dv = |E|, and a corresponding tariﬀ arc av. We connect
the source sv to the tail of the tariﬀ arc av, and the head of av to the destina-
tion tv, using zero cost ﬁxed cost arcs. Moreover, there is a ﬁxed cost arc (sv, tv)
with cost (|V | + 1) for all vertices v ∈ V . For every edge e ∈ E we introduce a
client with origin-destination pair {se, te} and unit demand. The upper bound
on the cost of routing this demand is given by the ﬁxed cost arc (se, te) with
cost 1. For all edges e ∈ E and all vertices v ∈ V with v ∈ e, we furthermore
introduce ﬁxed cost arcs (se, tail(av)) and (head(av), te), with zero cost. This
transformation results in an instance of the all-service RTP with |V | tariﬀ arcs,
and |V | + |E| clients. Figure 4 gives an example of such a transformation for a
graph G = (V,E) with 3 nodes and 2 edges.
We claim that G has an independent set of cardinality at least k if and only
if there exists a tariﬀ policy for the all-service RTP with a total revenue of
|V ||E|(k + 1) + |E|.
First, assume that G has an independent set V ′ of cardinality k. For all
v ∈ V ′, set the tariﬀ on the corresponding tariﬀ arc av to |V |+ 1, and all other
tariﬀs to 1. By the deﬁnition of an independent set, for any edge e = (v, u) ∈ E
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Fig. 4. Reduction of Independent Set to all-service RTP
at least one of the vertices, v or u, is not in V ′. Therefore, the tariﬀ of at least one
of the tariﬀ arcs, av or au is 1. All clients corresponding to an edge e can thus be
served, using one of the tariﬀ arcs av or au. The clients (sv, tv) corresponding to
the vertices v ∈ V are also served, since the upper bound of |V |+1 is not exceeded
with the so-deﬁned tariﬀs. Hence, all demands are served. The revenue consists
of |E| from all clients corresponding to the edges E of G, |E|(|V |+1)k from the
clients corresponding to the independent set V ′, and |E|(|V |−k) from the clients
corresponding to V \ V ′. That yields a total revenue of |E||V |(k + 1) + |E|.
Conversely, assume that there exists a set of tariﬀs that captures all demands,
such that the revenue is |E||V |(k+1)+ |E|. We will show that this implies that
the graph G has an independent set of cardinality at least k. Since all demands
are captured at this tariﬁcation strategy, for any edge e = (v, u) ∈ E, the
tariﬀ on at least one of the arcs, av or au, is 1. Consider the set of vertices
V ′ := {v ∈ V : tav > 1}. By deﬁnition, no pair of nodes v, u ∈ V ′ is connected
by an edge. Hence, V ′ is an independent set in G. Let k′ := |V ′|. The revenue
is equal to |E|+ |E|(|V | − k′) + |E|(|V |+ 1)k′ = |E||V |(k′ + 1) + |E|, which by
assumption is at least as large as |E||V |(k + 1) + |E|. This implies that k′ ≥ k
and thus that V ′ is an independent set in G of cardinality k′ ≥ k.
Now, let us assume that we have an α-approximation algorithm A for the
all-service RTP, with α ≥ 1. Consider any instance G = (V,E) of Independent
Set, and the all-service RTP resulting from the above reduction. We can assume
that both the optimal solution and the solution produced by A only utilize tariﬀ
values 1 or |V |+1, because any tariﬀ greater than 1 and not equal to |V |+1 can
be turned into |V |+ 1 with a revenue gain. So ΠOPT = |E||V |(k + 1) + |E| for
some k, and ΠA = |E||V |(k′ + 1) + |E| for some k′. The ﬁrst part of the proof
yields that the maximal independent set of G has size k, and algorithm A can
be used to ﬁnd an independent set of size at least k′. Moreover,
1
α
≤ |E||V |(k
′ + 1) + |E|
|E||V |(k + 1) + |E| =
1 + 1|V | + k
′
1 + 1|V | + k
≤ 2 + k
′
1 + k
,
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hence k′ ≥ (k + 1)/α − 2. In other words, we have an O(α)–approximation
algorithm for the Independent Set problem.
It is now well known from work of H˚astad [6] that the Independent Set
problem cannot have a polynomial time approximation algorithm with worst case
guarantee O(|V |1/2−ε) unless P = NP, and that it cannot have a polynomial time
approximation algorithm with worst case guarantee O(|V |1−ε) unless ZPP = NP.
Since the number of tariﬀ arcsm in our transformation equals |V |, the ﬁrst claim
of the theorem follows. Since the number of clients n in our transformation equals
|V |+ |E| ∈ O(|V |2), the second claim follows. 	unionsq
On the positive side, we can show the following.
Theorem 6. There exists an n-approximation algorithm for the all-service river
tariﬁcation problem.
The proof works by enumeration over all m·n possibilities for a maximum
revenue client using a speciﬁc arc. Given that arc-client pair, we can ﬁnd a
corresponding optimal tariﬀ for that arc in polynomial time using binary search,
in each step solving a system of linear inequalities. We skip the details due to
space limitations.
7 Polynomially Solvable Special Cases
Several polynomially solvable special cases of the (general) tariﬁcation problem
are discussed by Labbe´ et al. [9] and van Hoesel et al. [12]. Clearly, these results
hold for the problem considered in this paper, too.
In addition, the river tariﬁcation problem is also polynomially solvable if the
number of clients n is bounded from above by a constant. In that case, the
number of assignments of clients to tariﬀ arcs is bounded by mn which is a
polynomial for ﬁxed n. Consider therefore the following formulation, where we
use notation as given next. The path taken by each client in the network is
denoted by p∗k ∈ Pk, and Pk represents the set of all possible paths taken by a
client k ∈ K. The revenue associated with a path p ∈ Pk induced by a client k
with demand dk is deﬁned by πp(τ , dk) = dk · τa, where a is the (unique) tariﬀ
arc on path p. The ﬁxed cost of a path p is given by cp(dk) = dk
∑
a∈F∩p ca.
Then lp(τ , dk) := cp(dk) + πp(τ , dk) is the total cost of the path p ∈ Pk for a
client k.
max
τ
∑
k∈K
πp∗k(τ , dk)
s.t. lp(τ , dk) ≥ lp∗k(τ , dk) ∀k ∈ K,∀p ∈ Pk
τa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ T
(5)
Since for each client, there are at most m + 1 paths in the network, |Pk| is
bounded by m+ 1. Hence, the number of constraints is polynomial in the input
data. Therefore, if we solve mn instances of (5), we can retrieve the optimal
solution in polynomial time.
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8 Numerical Results
As stated previously, whenever the function that describes the total revenue in an
optimal non-uniform solution, i.e. the staircase function deﬁned in (2), is close
to a straight line, geometric intuition suggests a worst-case ratio for uniform
tariﬁcation of approximately 2. The worst case Example 1 crucially hinges on a
(staircase) function that approximates a hyperbola. Thus, it can be conjectured
that the empirical performance of uniform tariﬁcation policies outperforms the
theoretical bounds we have found. This is indeed conﬁrmed in the following
numerical experiments, displayed in Table 1. The study is based on instances
obtained from France Te´le´com.
Table 1. Quality of Uniform Tariﬁcation on France Te´le´com instances
Instance |N | |A| m n ΠOPT ΠUTP %
RTN1 29 94 7 15 841 624 74%
RTN2 29 98 6 21 4099 3496 85%
RTN3 59 206 10 13 1118 880 79%
RTN4 59 204 10 20 2217 1512 68%
RTN5 49 120 9 21 74948 55968 74%
RTN6 33 116 15 12 28166 20328 72%
These instances represent telecommunication networks for the international
interconnections market, as described in Section 2. We compare the optimal so-
lutions for uniform tariﬀs (ΠUTP ) and non-uniform tariﬀs (ΠOPT ). The optimal
non-uniform solution is calculated using the model and mixed integer program-
ming formulation described in Bouhtou et al. [1]. The value ofΠUTP is calculated
using the same formulation, requiring that all tariﬀs be equal. As such, we do
not compare the actual computation times, but are just interested in eﬀective-
ness of the optimal uniform tariﬁcation policies. Table 1 gives a brief description
of each network, stating the number of nodes, arcs, tariﬀ arcs and clients. The
optimal non-uniform and uniform solution values are displayed in the columns
ΠOPT and ΠUTP . The ﬁnal column is the approximation ratio.
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